Dr Gori makes the important point that exposures often cannot be measured directly because they accumulate over time and therefore are typically measured with error. 1 We disagree, however, with his characterization that exposure measurement is 'an intractable problem' that will, 'inevitably leav(e) much of epidemiology on the dreaded sidelines of science.' The method we proposed to quantify the effect of exposure misclassification (or any binary variable that is subject to misclassification) requires that the user specify distributions around bias parameters, such as the sensitivity and specificity of classification. The wide interval Dr Gori notes in our example accounts for both the random error in the study and our uncertainty about classification error. Our uncertainty about the latter error is very large, resulting in a much wider interval than the conventional frequentist interval.
The width of the interval yielded by our method depends on the specified distributions of the bias parameters. Dr Gori characterized these distributions as 'arbitrary', but this is not so. The purpose of a sensitivity analysis is to determine the sensitivity of the results to assumptions about sources of bias. These assumptions should be informed by validation studies relevant to the classification methods of the study and by the investigators' understanding of the validity of the method. The distributions chosen for sensitivity and specificity (or any bias parameters employed for a sensitivity analysis) should not, therefore, be arbitrary but rather should be based on the best available evidence and by explicit judgments.
Although the distributions are not arbitrary, there is no 'correct' distribution either. Alternative distributions for the bias parameters that another investigator might specify represent different combinations of evidence and judgment. Thus, while one may not agree with the particular distributions chosen, the distributions are transparent and open to debate by the community of stakeholders. If one disagrees with the chosen distributions, one can specify alternatives and investigate their impact.
This process reflects the fact that there is always uncertainty about the biases and therefore debate over parameterization of the distributions and the magnitude of the parameters. Sensitivity analysis elevates the discussion from the qualitative plane (e.g. 'the study result may have been affected by classification errors') to the quantitative plane (e.g. 'the study result changes little with the first set of bias parameters, but the second set suggests substantial bias'). When high sensitivity is detected over the range of plausible parameter values, we can conclude that the conventional results seriously understate the uncertainty we should have about the results.
A sensitivity analysis of the type we proposed is most useful when much is already known about the biases in a study and when conventional results with narrow frequentist confidence intervals have been observed. When the conventional confidence intervals include all values that stakeholders find plausible, the lack of precision makes it less urgent to account for systematic error. When those intervals are narrow, however, they may encourage overconfidence in the results and may even improperly anchor evaluations and thus detract from the ability of stakeholders to properly assess the uncertainty they should have. Our approach to sensitivity analysis seeks to avoid these cognitive problems by incorporating reasoned and explicit assumptions about the sources of systematic error into the analysis, in the form of distributions for the bias parameters. Note that the conventional analysis arises when we set all these distributions to a single 'no bias' point, an assumption we know is very wrong.
When little evidence exists to inform a sensitivity analysis, these assumptions might be informed more by judgment than by data. This circumstance ought to alert the investigators and stakeholders to the concomitant uncertainty about the study's results. In addition, under these circumstances, one might instead wish to ask, 'What combination of bias parameters could have created the observed association had there been no true effect of the exposure on the disease studied?' or 'What combination of bias parameters could have obscured a true association of (say) RR 5 2, given an observed null result?' In these cases, the stakeholders can judge whether the required parameters are plausible.
Among common alternatives to sensitivity analysis are ignoring the potential bias or biases; making qualitative statements of the impact that biases might have had (i.e. 'non-differential misclassification would tend to bias our results towards the null'); and presenting frequentist confidence intervals as if they incorporated the total error. These methods are more arbitrary than sensitivity analysis because they entail implicit assumptions about classification errors that (depending on the context) may be seen as implausible or even absurd if made explicit. Ignoring systematic error in statistical analysis, as is commonly done, can be far more misleading than can an interval that is widened using explicit and plausible assumptions, even if the latter are tenuous. 
